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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to a transfer order from the Utah Supreme
Court under Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j) & (4)(West 2006) and Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Because the trial court granted dismissal pursuant to Utah Rule Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and Utah Code Annotated § 49-11-6135 this court reviews the issues presented
granting no deference to the trial court's decision, accepting all facts presented as true,
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Appellant Mr. Gunn.
See, Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,ffif6-9, 67 P.3d 466.
Issue #1:
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Gunn's declaratory action for
failure to exhaust administrative procedures before determining that a valid subrogation
claim, capable of resolution by an administrative body, even existed.
The question before the court is whether PEHP holds a valid claim to subrogation
or reimbursement. If PEHP holds no claim legal claim to reimbursement or subrogation,
then nothing exists which can be heard by an administrative commission. (R. 97). PEHP,
through its inaction and refusal to participate in the underlying litigation, waived any
claim to subrogation or reimbursement from settlement proceeds obtained in that
litigation. (R. 98). Further, PEHP can only be subrogated to the same extent Mr. Gunn
1

could prevail against the defendant in the underlying litigation. (R. 97). Before
proceeding to costly and time consuming administrative processes, there must be a valid
legal basis for the reimbursement claim sought to be put before an administrative hearing.
Issue #2:
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that as a matter of law PEHP's "Master
Policy" provision governing the appellate procedure for denial of benefits, including
review by a Medical Review Panel, compels Mr. Gunn to submit his dispute regarding
legal subrogation before that panel. (R. 128-129).
Statutes at Issue
Utah Code Annotated § 49-11-613, attached as Addendum 'A'
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (West 2006):
H

"The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief
is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The
declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case began as a slip and fall. Appellant Terry Gunn tripped over a speed

bump in a parking lot owned by defendant Valley Properties. (R. 2). During his fall over
the speed bump, Terry Gunn ruptured the patella tendon of his left knee. (R. 2). As a
result of these injuries, PEHP paid for medical expenses incurred by Mr. Gunn. (R. 66).
2

Mr. Gunn filed a complaint for personal injury against Valley Properties. Valley
Properties answered the complaint and asserted comparative fault as an affirmative
defense. (R. 6). As discovery in the case proceeded, counsel for Mr. Gunn contacted
PEHP through correspondence. (R. 102). The purpose of the correspondence was to
mitigate any claim to subrogation or reimbursement sought by PEHP which might
interfere with the ability to settle or resolve a slip and fall case where significant liability
questions always exist due to comparative fault.
On July 21, 2004 Counsel informed PEHP that in order to protect any claim of
subrogation against settlement proceeds or judgment in the case they must either: (1)
accept a pro-rata reduction for comparative fault, attorney fees and costs; or, (2) appoint
counsel to participate in the litigation and protect any alleged subrogation claims. (R.
102). Counsel for Mr. Gunn warned PEHP that if they did not agree to the terms "we will
not seek reimbursement of medical expenses in this case." (Id.). At no time did PEHP
agree to the terms. (R. 94). At no time did PEHP attempt to enter into the lawsuit. (Id.).
At no time did PEHP institute administrative procedures for their claim to reimbursement.
(Id.).
On May 16, 2005, the trial court ordered mediation in the underlying slip and fall
case. (R. 33). Counsel for Mr. Gunn again contacted PEHP's representatives and
requested a reduction of the subrogation amount reflecting both comparative fault and
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 95). PEHP never responded to this request. A mediation in
3

this case was held on August 3, 2005 with former Judge David Roth acting as mediator.
(R. 95). During mediation Mediator Roth contacted representatives for PEHP and
requested that they reduce the amount they were seeking in order to facilitate a settlement.
(Id.). PEHP refused to grant a reduction. Mr. Gunn thereafter agreed to settle the case in
an amount of $15,000 leaving open the question regarding PEHP's claimed right to
subrogate in the amount of $7,461.32.
On September 12, 2005 Mr. Gunn filed a declaratory action against PEHP. (R.
65). Mr. Gunn admitted that PEHP held a claim to seek reimbursement or subrogation for
benefits paid as a result of the negligence of a third party. (R. 66). However, Mr. Gunn
contended that as subrogation PEHP could only recover benefits to the extent of the third
party's liability. Absent a legal determination apportioning fault to Valley Properties in
an amount greater than the fault apportioned to Mr. Gunn, PEHP held no viable claim for
reimbursement. (Id.). Additionally, Mr. Gunn contended that PEHP must pay a
proportionate share of attorney fees and costs out of any reimbursement proceeds. (Id.).
Mr. Gunn also contended that absent a demonstration that Mr. Gunn had been made
whole by the settlement, PEHP lacked a legally viable subrogation claim. (Id.). Finally,
Mr. Gunn contended that PEHP willfully failed to protect any alleged subrogation claim
and therefore waived any claim they may have held. (R. 67).
PEHP filed a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). (R. 83).
PEHP contended that Mr. Gunn could not obtain declaratory relief "without first
4

exhausting his administrative remedies under U.C.A. Title 49 and the PEHP Master
Policy." (R. 72). Mr. Gunn responded that the administrative procedures referred to by
PEHP could not resolve the threshold legal question as to whether a valid subrogation
right or claim to reimbursement existed in the first instance. (R. 100). The trial court
dismissed Mr. Gunn's declaratory action concluding that the "allegations made by
plaintiff do not grant this court subject matter jurisdiction over the claims because the
plaintiff cannot obtain declaratory relief or other relief without first exhausting agency
administrative remedies." (R. 131).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Mr. Gunn warned PEHP he would not pursue medical expenses in his personal
injury action. PEHP took no affirmative steps to protect their alleged claim of
subrogation for medical expenses. PEHP waived their claim to reimbursement by failing
to take any affirmative steps to protect that claim. This legal question as to whether
PEHP waived their reimbursement claim must be resolved prior to compelling Mr. Gunn
to participate in administrative procedures.
As the party asserting a right to subrogation, PEHP bears the burden of
demonstrating a valid claim to subrogation. Standing in the shoes of Mr. Gunn, PEHP
must demonstrate that Mr. Gunn's negligence in the underlying case was proportionately
less than the third party tortfeasor Valley Properties. Absent a demonstration that Mr.
Gunn could recover under our comparative negligence scheme, PEHP themselves are not
5

entitled to recover. Accordingly, PEHP holds no legal entitlement to claims subrogation
and there is nothing to be resolved by an administrative hearing.
The Master Policy requires participants to submit a grievance regarding denial of
benefits before a Medical Review Committee after receiving notice of denial. Any "[r]
equests for review of claims" should be submitted before the medical review committee.
(R. 82). A declaratory action seeking to invalidate PEHP's alleged subrogation claim
cannot be dismissed for failure to exhaust an administrative procedure which governs
claims for benefits.
ARGUMENT
The question before the Court is whether PEHP holds a valid claim to subrogation
or reimbursement. PEHP began their motion to dismiss with the position that" PEHP
holds a valid claim due to its contractual subrogation rights." (R. 71). However, both
PEHP and the trial court erred in taking it for granted that a valid subrogation or
reimbursement claim existed. Before compelling Mr. Gunn to spend time and money in
pursuing administrative procedures, the preliminary legal question as to whether a valid
claim exists must be resolved.
I.

BECAUSE NO VALID SUBROGATION OR REIMBURSEMENT
CLAIM EXISTS, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
MR. GUNN'S DECLARATORY ACTION.

According to PEHP Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613 sets forth the appeal process for
bringing a claim against PEHP for any "benefit claim or legal right under this title." (R.
6

73). PEHP concedes this section governs "a claim against PEHP for any benefit claim or
legal right under this title." (R. 73). Very simply, Plaintiff has not brought a "benefit
claim" against PEHP. Plaintiff also is not seeking to establish his "legal right" to benefits
under the Act. Rather, Mr. Gunn seeks resolution of the purely legal question of whether
PEHP can abstain from any involvement in the case and at the close of proceedings still
claim the right to subrogation or reimbursement. There is nothing in Title 49 that
remotely addresses the issue presented in this suit. Whether PEHP holds a valid
subrogation claim must be resolved on equitable and legal principles well outside the
scope of authority authorized to the administrative body under the Act.
Requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial redress
begins with the fundamental assumption that the administrative agency has jurisdiction
over the particular complaint at issue. "The basic purpose underlying the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is to allow an administrative agency to perform
functions within its special competence." Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial
Com'n of Utah, 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As a matter of statute, the
administrative body to which PEHP seeks to put this issue holds only the power to "hear
and determine all facts pertaining to applications for benefits." Utah Code Ann. 1953 §
49-1 l-613(2)(c) (West 2006). Resolving whether a viable legal claim to subrogation
exists has nothing to do with a medical/dental/disability, etc., benefits claim against
PEHP. Neither PEHP nor the administrative body has "special competence11 or expertise
7

in the area of determining the legal question as to whether subrogation exists.
By contrast, our district courts are endowed with the special competence to resolve
preliminary legal questions, especially those cases which seek a declaratory determination
regarding the legal relations amongst the parties:
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief
is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The
declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (West 2006). In this case, Mr. Gunn sought a determination
that PEHP lacked a legally viable subrogation claim. The district court could, and should
have, declared the relation between the parties in either the affirmative or the negative.
Where declaratory relief is sought, the party against whom it is sought should not
be heard to argue that administrative procedures have not been exhausted. In IML
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975)(overruled on other grounds), the
defendant argued the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative procedures before pursuing
a declaratory action. The Utah Supreme Court responded that this argument "is not well
taken on this appeal... [because] there is no question of fact or fiction here to justify a
hearing before the Commissioner... This case is brought under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, which ideally is fitted to this case,-since there is ... only a legal problem posed." Id.
at 298. Because the only question presented to the district court was one regarding the
8

legal existence and extent of PEHP's alleged claim to reimbursement, it is the district
court who should resolve the matter through the declaratory action.
The requirement of exhausting administrative remedies "does not apply when, as
here, the administrative officer or body, acts without the scope of his or its defined
statutory authority. The question here involved, being strictly one of law, is for the courts
and an appeal to the board of examiners would have been futile and useless." Walker
Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 238, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (1964). Courts are
in a better position to decide the legal question of whether a viable subrogation claim for
reimbursement exists because such questions turn upon matters of equity and application
of law.
In TDMy Inc. V. Tax Com % 2004 UT App 433, 103 P.3d 190 this court reversed
a trial court's dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. TDM sought a
determination that the Commission's actions improperly infringed upon TDM's first
amendment rights, a legal question. In reversing the trial court dismissal, this Court held
that "[ejxhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the legal questions
involved are threshold questions, and their determination could not be avoided by any
turn the case might [] take in an administrative proceeding." Id. ^ 5. The administrative
body under Title 49 lacks any ability to resolve the threshold legal question of whether a
valid subrogation or reimbursement claim exists. "The exhaustion of administrative
remedies here would serve no useful purpose." Id. at 16.
9

The fundamental assumption that the administrative agency has jurisdiction is
lacking in this case. Mr. Gunn agrees that PEHP is entitled to reimbursement out of the
settlement proceeds based on a claim of subrogation or reimbursement. At present,
however, the legal question before the Court involves whether PEHP even holds a viable
subrogation claim. Because they holds no legally valid reimbursement claim, PEHP lacks
the ability to compel participation in administrative procedures.
A.

By Inaction and Refusal To Participate, PEHP Waived Any
Alleged Claim to Reimbursement or Subrogation.

By sleeping on any alleged claim of subrogation, PEHP lost the ability to pursue
that claim. "Subrogation is not a matter of right but may be invoked only in those
circumstances where justice demands its application, and the rights of the one seeking
subrogation have a greater equity than the one who opposes him." Educators Mut. Ins.
Ass'n v. Allied Property andCas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Utah 1995). Because
PEHP refused, on multiple occasions, to protect their claim to subrogation, equity offers
no protection either. "It is the insurer's duty to protect subrogation rights.... It is generally
acknowledged the insurer's safest course to protect those rights is to seek intervention in
the insured's lawsuit against the legally responsible third party." Hodge v. Kirkpatrick
Development, Inc., 130 Cal.App.4th 540, 550, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 303, 309 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.
2005).
Here, PEHP received warning early on in the litigation that if they did not agree to
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reduce their subrogation claim by a proportionate share of comparative fault, as well as
attorney's fees and costs, Mr. Gunn would not pursue reimbursement of medical expenses
on their behalf. (R. 102). PEHP chose not to take any affirmative steps to protect their
alleged claim to subrogation. Nor did PEHP agree to terms under which Mr. Gunn would
have protected their claimed reimbursement for medical expenses paid. Failing to take
steps to protect their claim, PEHP cannot expect equities of the courts to protect them at
this late hour.
Where an insurer fails to pursue or protect any claim to reimbursement or
subrogation courts will not force the insured to act to as the insurer's collection agency.
To permit Met Life to pursue its right of refund, despite having failed to timely
assert this right, would be tantamount to having the plaintiffs act as a collection
agency for the insurer during their lawsuit against the tortfeasors ... It is manifestly
unjust to require the recipient of medical payments, who pays a premium for such
coverage, and who is called upon to grant a right of subrogation to the payor, to
then, through his or her lawyer, act as a collection agency for the paying carrier in
a suit against the tort-feasor. Neither the recipient nor the lawyer has been retained
to act in this capacity. Nor can the carrier who made the medical payments sit back
and become enriched by the fruits of their efforts and endeavors.
Teichman by Teichman v. Community Hosp. of Western Suffolk, 617 N.Y.S.2d 338,
343 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1994)(citation and emphasis omitted).
Similarly, the court in Simmons v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
391 S.E.2d 560, (S.C. 1990) held that:
an Insurer cannot sit down and hold its hands and purse and thereafter escape
liability for fulfillment of its contract by reason of the insured's effort, after fair
notice, to recoup his loss by litigation against a wrongdoer... when it failed to
11

appear or intervene in the action against [tortfeasor], Insurer waived its
subrogation rights.
M a t 562-563.
PEHP was informed on July 21, 2004 that they needed to take steps to preserve
any claim to reimbursement or subrogation. Despite this warning PEHP did nothing
during the intervening 12 months between that warning and the date of mediation August
3, 2005. See, e.g., Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1936)(holding no
entitlement to subrogation for 'culpable indiligence' or 'unjustifiable negligence.' in
failing to protect claim); and, Valora v. Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund, 847
A.2d 681, 685 (Pa.Super. 2004)(health insurer's "failure to exercise due diligence in
asserting its undeniable right to subrogation has resulted in waiver of that right.").
Having failed to act reasonably through either active participation, intervention as a
matter of right, or instigation of the very administrative proceedings they now seek to
compel Mr. Gunn to participate in, PEHP waived any claim they may have had for
subrogation or reimbursement. Because no legal right to subrogation exists, there exists
no claim for the administrative body to hear in this case. Hence, it was error for the trial
court to dismiss the case.
B.

Any Claim to Subrogation Depends Upon Whether a Third-Party
Tortfeasor Bears Responsibility.

Subrogation extends only as far as the liability of a third-party tortfeasor. PEHP
can only claim a right of subrogation to the same extent that Terry himself could
12

successfully exercise a claim against Valley Properties.
In asserting any purported subrogation right against the third party, the insurer can
be subrogated to only such rights as the insured possesses, because the insurer, as
subrogee, 'steps into the shoes' of the insured. Because the insurer can succeed
only to those rights or causes of action that the insured possesses against the third
party, the insurer is subject to any viable defenses the third party can assert against
the insured.
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, f 23, 52 P.3d 1179 (citation
omitted). "The doctrine of subrogation allows an insurer, having paid a loss resulting
from a peril insured against, to step into the shoes of its insured and recoup its losses from
a tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss." Birch v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 2005 UT
App 395, H 7.
The party claiming a right of subrogation bears the burden of demonstrating the
facts which entitle them to reimbursement. The "party requesting subrogation has the
burden of proving that there is some basis for asserting subrogation." 83 C.J.S.
Subrogation § 97 (West 2006). PEHP's right to subrogation extends only as far as the
ability to demonstrate that Valley Properties bears fault for his injury. Hence, if Terry
were found 45% at fault for tripping on a speed bump in Valley Properties' parking lot,
PEHP would only be entitled to receive 55% of the amount they paid in benefits under
subrogation principles. If Terry were found 50% at fault, under Utah's Comparative
Negligence Act §78-27-38 (West 2006), PEHP would be entitled to receive nothing.
Nowhere does the Utah State Retirement Act or the Utah Administrative Procedures Act

13

confer authority or jurisdiction to determine the relative comparative fault of tortfeasors
and injured plaintiffs. Further, under PEHP's "Medical Master Policy" it remains entirely
unclear how a "Medical Review Committee" might actually decide the legal question as
to whether a right of subrogation actually exists. (R. 77, 82).
Here, PEHP seeks to compel Mr. Gunn to participate in an administrative hearing
without first determining the legal question of whether PEHP holds a viable claim to
reimbursement. Utah courts acknowledge parties need not pursue administrative
procedures where preliminary questions of law exist. In Brumley v. Utah State Tax
Com'n., 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993), as here, the "Plaintiffs' demands upon the
Commission raised several legal issues." The court held that, because preliminary legal
questions were presented which could not be resolved by the administrative board, "it was
appropriate for plaintiffs to file their action for a declaratory judgment in the district court
to obtain rulings on the legal questions." Id. See, also, Hatton-Wardv. Salt Lake City
Corp., 828 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)("it makes no sense to require
[claimant] first to go to the Commission... The law does not require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies when it would serve no useful purpose."); Walker Bank & Trust
Co. v. Taylor, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah 1964)(exhaustion requirement "does not apply
when, as here, the administrative officer or body, acts without the scope of his or its
defined statutory authority. The question here involved, being strictly one of law, is for
the courts and an appeal to the board of examiners would have been futile and useless.").
14

Standing in the shoes of Mr. Gunn, PEHP must demonstrate that his fault does not
exceed that of Valley Properties. Absent a showing that Valley Properties' fault exceeds
Mr. Gunn's, PEHP holds no claim which can be submitted to an administrative body.
Importantly, Mr. Gunn took all steps required under PEHP's "Medical Master Policy."
Mr. Gunn provided the notice required by section 4.4. (R. 81, 102). Having failed to act
to protect their own interest or agree to the terms set forth by Mr. Gunn to protect their
interests, PEHP cannot come in at the last minute seek full reimbursement. It serves no
useful purpose to require Mr. Gunn first to go to an administrative hearing, where the
administrative body acts beyond the scope of its authority and apportioning fault among
Mr. Gunn and Valley Properties.
II.

THE PEHP MASTER POLICY DOES NOT COMPEL
SUBROGATION DISPUTES BE SUBMITTED BEFORE A
MEDICAL REVIEW COMMITTEE.

Determining whether PEHP's appeal process for claims denials applies to the legal
dispute over whether a valid claim of subrogation exists involves answering the following
question:
Would the meaning of the language of the insurance contract be plain to a person
of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and
reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in
the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy?
Farmers Ins. Exchange v Versaw, 2004 UT 73, ^}8, 99 P3d 796.
Nothing in the PEHP "Master Policy" provides a claims appeal process for
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assertions of subrogation by PEHP. Under subsection 5.3, members "may request a full
and fair review, by writing to the Medical Review Committee within 180 days after
receiving notice of denial. Requests for review of claims should be mailed to: [the]
Medical Review Committee." (R. 82) (emphasis added). The appeals process under the
PEHP Master Policy ultimately leads to submission before administrative procedures. (R.
82). The usual and natural meaning of the words in the master policy provides a
procedure only to appeal the denial of benefits, not to resolve an assertion of subrogation
by PEHP.
While the Master Policy retains a right of subrogation by PEHP, nothing in that
policy suggests that an insured gives up his right to have the validity of a subrogation
claim resolved in a court of law. Moreover, the retention of a subrogation claim resides
in an entirely separate section of the policy, under the heading "Subrogation and
Contractual Reimbursement." (R. 81). By contrast, the provisions relied upon by PEHP
and the trial court reside under the section "Claims Submission, Information and
Appeals." (Id.). Mr. Gunn is not attempting to claim that PEHP did not pay his claims,
or provide benefits.

^

Rather, Mr. Gunn disputes PEHP's ability to claim subrogation against settlement
funds obtained without any involvement from PEHP, funds which came about solely from
the efforts of Mr. Gunn and his attorneys. Mr. Gunn disputes PEHP's ability to seek full
reimbursement from funds which not only failed to make him whole, but out of which he
16

had to pay attorney's fees and costs. (R. 66). Moreover, because of the nature of slip and
fall cases, the amount of funds obtained were significantly compromised in light of issues
of comparative fault. Because insurance contracts "are typically drafted by insurance
company attorneys, are not negotiated by the insured, and are offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, this jurisdiction, like many others, has declared in favor of a
liberal construction in favor of the insured." Id. at ^f 24 (citations omitted). PEHP simply
cannot argue that the usual and natural meaning of the words in the policy allows a
medical review committee working under an appellate process designed to review denials
of benefits could address any of these issues.
CONCLUSION
PEHP stood by and refused to participate in any meaningful way throughout the
course of the underlying litigation. Even after notice and warning that their claim for
medical expenses would not be protected by Mr. Gunn, PEHP did nothing. There exists
nothing in the record to support the viability of a subrogation claim asserted by PEHP.
Before compelling participation in administrative review, there must be some showing
that PEHP holds a valid subrogation claim which the administrative body could review in
the first instance. Because PEHP's Medical Review Committee cannot resolve the
preliminary legal question as to whether a claimed subrogation right even exists, the trial
court erred in dismissing Mr. Gunn's request for declaratory relief under Utah Rules Civil
Procedure 12 (b). Accordingly, Mr. Gunn respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
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trial court's decision and remand with instructions that PEHP holds no valid subrogation
claim as a matter of law.
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1953 § 49-11-613
s Utah Code Annotated Currentness
i 49. Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act (Refs & Annos)
I Chapter 11. Utah State Retirement Systems Administration
*H Part 6. Procedures and Records
•*§ 4 9 - 1 1 - 6 1 3 . Appeals procedure—Right of appeal to hearing officer—Board reconsiderationJudicial review

All members, retirees, participants, alternative payees, or covered individuals of a system, plan, or program
this title shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this title.
^ y dispute regarding a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right under this title is subject to the
edures provided under this section.
\ person who disputes a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right under this title shall request a ruling by
executive director.
\ person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director with respect to any benefit, right, obligation, or
loyment right under this title shall request a review of that claim by a hearing officer.
e hearing officer shall:
)e hired by the executive director after consultation with the board;
ollow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, except as
ifically modified under this title;
iear and determine all facts pertaining to applications for benefits under any system, plan, or program under
title and all matters pertaining to the administration of the office; and
nake conclusions of law in determining the person's rights under any system, plan, or program under this title
matters pertaining to the administration of the office.
2 board shall review and approve or deny all decisions of the hearing officer in accordance with rules adopted
board.

i moving party in any proceeding brought under this section shall bear the burden of proof.

>arty may file an application for reconsideration by the board upon any of the following grounds:
iat the board acted in excess of its powers;
lat the order or award was procured by fraud;
tat the evidence does not justify the determination of the hearing officer; or
lat the party has discovered new material evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been
vered or procured prior to the hearing.
1

board shall affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the hearing officer, or remand the application to the
I officer for further consideration.

arty aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain judicial review by complying with the procedures and
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.

board may make rules to implement this section.

)87, c. 1, § 29; Laws 1987, c. 112, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 150; Laws 1988, c. 102, § 2; Laws 1988, c.
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haustion of administrative remedies 2
}ht to appeal 4
Equitable estoppel
sneral rule, doctrine of estoppel is not assertable against state and its agencies; however, exceptions exist in
ual circumstances in which it is plain that interests of justice so require. Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
I, 795„PJ2d 6 7 1 . Estoppel o*j62^2(l)
matter of law, county employee established all elements necessary to estop state retirement board from
ing its representation that employee could retire without having to purchase years of prior service; with all
ct facts before it, board issued documents advising employee that he satisfied statutory requirements and did
ave to purchase prior service, and employee resigned $37,000 a year position that he could not regain in
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xhaustion of administrative remedies
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Retirement Office, 1980, 621 P.2d 1234. Admimstratiye Law And Procedure o* 229
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pn v. Utah State Retirement Office, 1980, 621 P.2d 1234. Administrative Law And Procedure o^ 229
r public employees bringing action to recover employer contributions to state retirement fund were required to
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smissal
r public employees' action to recover employer contributions to retirement fund should not have been
sed for failure to join city and city hospital where employees had worked as it had not been shown that either
3l or city had joint interest in employees' suit and decision as to employees' rights to payments made on their
by employer would not affect legal rights of city or city hospital. U.C.A. 1953, 49-10-1 et seq., 49-10-24;
)f Civil Procedure, Rule 19(a). Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 1980. 6?1 P ?H MIA M,«n,^~-,i
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on of former, public employees, against the Retirement Office to recover employer contributions to the retirement
j was not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act where notice of claim was filed with the Attorney General
agency concerned within a year after cause of action arose as required by statute, and amended complaint, filed
i matter of right, indicating employees' compliance with Governmental Immunity Act was filed within one year
r denial of claim or after end of 90-day period in which claim was deemed to have been denied. U.C.A. 1953, 491 et seq., 49- 10-24, 63-30-12; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a). Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office,
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